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attack became international headline news with front-page billing, the CDC 
came under intense scrutiny for its handling of the crisis.   The Role of Spokesperson Initially, the CDC assumed the first case of inhalational anthrax, which oc-
curred in Florida, was an isolated incident, with good reason. The US had ex-
perienced only 18 cases of inhalational anthrax in the previous century. Within 
days, however, as the anthrax attack spread to the Capitol, the CDC recognized 
it was engulfed in a full-fledged crisis. 
in Ambiguous and Complex Crises: 
The CDC and Anthrax 
M. Scott Barrett, Kathryn C. Hasbargen 
This study examines the role of spokespersons for the CDC in the print me-
dia as the crisis unfolded. The print media was selected because of its wide dis-
tribution and its availability. Throughout the crisis, three types of spokespersons 
emerged in the print media: 1) official and formal CDC sources, including ad-
ministrators of the CDC and its official spokespeople; 2) unofficial CDC 
sources, including supra resources such as CDC lab workers, Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) staff (those employees or staff of the HHS 
and CDC not authorized to comment or report on anthrax and the investigation; 
and 3) unofficial and informal sources, including anyone called upon by the 
press to comment, including former CDC staff and non-CDC bioterrorist and 
anthrax experts.  
Anthony Ocana, Vern Markey, Matthew P. Berg 
Scott Grand, Timothy L. Sellnow 
Abstract 
This study evaluates the role of spokespersons in complex organizations 
facing ambiguous crises. Specifically, the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention’s (CDC) response to the anthrax crisis in 2001 is offered as a case study. 
A content analysis of the print media coverage of the anthrax crisis reveals that 
many claiming affiliation with the CDC spoke on behalf of the organization, 
resulting in what appeared to be a fragmented CDC message. The study con-
cludes that the CDC’s failure to provide a central spokesperson contributed to 
the ambiguity of the situation.   
In this study, we first provide a context for interpreting spokespersons dur-
ing crisis situations. Next, we clarify the method for the study and reveal our key 
findings. We conclude with a series of conclusions and implications based on 
the study. Introduction 
Nearly all organizations may at some point face crisis situations (Cohn, 
2000). For the purpose of this study, crisis is defined as a “specific, unexpected, 
and nonroutine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty 
and threaten or are perceived to threaten an organization’s high-priority goals” 
(Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998). Ideally, organizations respond to crises with 
plans for communicating important information to stakeholders and public audi-
ences (Olaniran & Williams, 2001). For public or governmental organizations, a 
primary purpose of crisis communication is the reduction of public uncertainty 
and anxiety by dissemination of timely and accurate information on which an 
informed public can act (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002).  
Spokespersons in Organizational Crisis Situations 
Although an organization cannot predict a crisis, it can implement strategies 
to effectively respond to the vagaries of such an event. By preparing a system of 
communication, an organization can quickly respond to the public’s communi-
cation needs (Marra, 1998). If the press presents useful, rather than sensational-
ized, information on bioterrorism the public can make informed decisions 
(Covello, 1992; Osterholm & Schwartz, 2000; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 
2001). The best, most consistent information comes from the cooperation of all 
agencies involved (Osterholm & Schwatz, 2000). By including the organiza-
tion’s stakeholders in this multi-agency communication coordination, crises can 
be resolved more quickly and essential channels of communication can be cre-
ated, resulting in greater understanding between the organization and its stake-
holders (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001). The ability to properly disseminate 
information may then minimize erroneous public theorizing and avoid unneces-
sary public alarm. 
If effective crisis communication plans are used when an emergency arises, 
the organization has a better opportunity to meet its obligations to all stake-
holders and minimize the damage such events can do to reputation, image, and 
credibility (Fearn-Banks, 2002). Communicating such information in an orderly 
and precise manner is paramount. Hence, most crisis management plans encour-
age the appointment of a primary spokesperson to share consistent messages 
with the public (Coombs, 1999; Kaufman, Kesner, & Hazen, 1994; Benoit, 
1997; Turner, 1999; Rugo 2001). Should the public lose trust or confidence in a 
public organization, the ramifications can be distressing. A case in point is the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) response to the 2001 an-
thrax crisis. 
A crisis contingency plan helps expedite an organization’s image restoration 
process (Benoit, 1997). Such a crisis contingency plan should be based on what 
has been effective in past models. Effective strategies include three aspects. 
First, the organization should be willing to share information. Failure to provide 
information promptly can result in serious negative repercussions to the organi-
zation’s image and finances (Marra, 1998), while sharing information increases 
the organization’s credibility. Second, legitimacy can be regained when an or-
ganization is willing to accept responsibility for harmful mistakes (Hearit, 2001; 
On October 4, 2001, the CDC in Atlanta, Georgia, released a statement an-
nouncing that the death of Bob Stevens, of Boca Raton, Florida, was due to a 
suspected case of inhalational anthrax. In the months following, as the anthrax 
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son should be an industry expert and ally to the organization (Rugo, 2001). At 
the very least, the spokesperson should have a positive outlook toward both the 
press and the organization (Balian, 1999) and be both knowledgeable and flexi-
ble in the messages he or she provides (Murphy, 1996). To act quickly, a 
spokesperson must be an autonomous (Marra, 1998), experienced, and media-
trained person who is well informed, prepared, and self-controlled (Rugo, 2001; 
Nicolazzo, 2001). The key to public receptiveness of a spokesperson is credibil-
ity. Covello, Peters, Wojtecki, and Hyde (2001) state that not only do spokesper-
sons need to be trustworthy; they must also be the best persons to communicate 
messages of risk. If more challenging information needs to be communicated 
with a sense of credibility, a technical expert can be trained on message delivery 
and supported by an experienced spokesperson (Heath, 1995). The public attrib-
utes low credibility to government and industry spokespersons. It views gov-
ernments as having insufficient resources to meet the public demands and public 
agencies as conflict ridden and inadequate (Covello, 1992).  
Sellnow, Ulmer, & Snider, 1998). Finally, an organization must be flexible 
enough to meet the diverse needs of its different stakeholders (Benoit, 1997; 
Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995; Covello, Peters, Wojtecki, & Hyde, 2001). To avoid 
the threat of imposed legislative changes, an organization’s crisis plan can be 
designed to accommodate change in order to meet the needs of outside parties 
(Gaunt & Ollenburger, 1995). A successful public information campaign can 
help the organization regain public trust (Sellnow & Ulmer, 1995), as well as 
keep the public informed and involved (Covello, 1992). In a health threat situa-
tion, an effective plan lets the public know how best to reduce their personal 
health risk (Heath & Abel, 1996a).    
Identifying and presenting a centralized message can often avoid the detri-
ment caused by conflicting messages. Organizational procedures established to 
meet the needs of the media are a key variable in this process. In cases of a crisis 
with widespread public interest, the press needs information quickly. Journalists 
are likely to seek out members of an organization who can provide that informa-
tion (Covello, 1992). Organizations should try to accommodate them (Balian, 
1999). The intense media scrutiny may make controlling the message difficult 
because different members of an organization have different levels of knowl-
edge (Heath & Abel, 1996b). Because of this, all levels of employees should be 
informed on the organization’s message (Turner, 1999). If the organization has 
multiple people releasing information, message and time of release should be 
coordinated (Balian, 1999). To avoid a lapse in the stream of information, an 
organization’s communication with all involved parties—employees, investors 
and shareholders, and the media—should be continuous. This approach to in-
formation sharing reduces the risk of miscommunication or confusion regarding 
the organization’s intended messages (Burton, 1989; Turner, 1999). Coordina-
tion with other organizations sharing a common general goal is as important as 
coordination within an organization. Because different organizations may have 
different, even incompatible, agendas, one organization should be in charge dur-
ing a crisis (Osterholm and Schwartz, 2000). In risk situations, apparent dis-
agreements between agencies can lead to public mistrust. Coordinating organi-
zations need to work together from the early stages of a crisis to make sure the 
public receives clear, consistent messages. Risk communication training for all 
involved organizations is helpful. Indirectly involved, yet trusted, third party 
voices lending support to the centralized message will also help achieve the de-
sired result of a credible and consistent message (Covello, Peters, Wojtecki, & 
Hyde, 2001). 
Method 
Using three online databases (Lexus-Nexus, Infotrac, and the Electric Li-
brary), 503 anthrax and CDC-related news stories appearing in major US news-
papers from September 1, 2001, through February 25, 2002, were examined. 
These databases were selected based on their comprehensive indexing of a wide 
variety of major newspapers throughout the United States. The search focused 
on the words “CDC” and “anthrax.” The authors read each of the articles to 
identify instances where a CDC spokesperson was identified. A speaker was not 
identified as a CDC spokesperson unless the speaker was described in the news 
article as having some affiliation with the CDC. The identity of the spokespeo-
ple and their relationship to the CDC was recorded (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Number of Representatives and Appearances Totals 
Number of  
Appearances: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 15 20 22 41 51 111
41 13 7 3 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Discussion 
The data collected during this study indicate the CDC was faced with an 
ambiguous and complex crisis making it nearly, if not completely, impossible to 
consistently follow basic crisis communication principle of maintaining a cen-
tralized spokesperson during the crisis. 
An effective way for an organization to manage the messages it provides to 
the public is to have a single spokesperson (Kaufman, Kesner, & Hazen, 1994; 
Benoit, 1997; Turner, 1999; Rugo 2001). Having more than one spokesperson 
can result in mixed and confusing messages (Kaufman, Kesner, & Hazen, 1994). 
While a spokesperson should be a top executive in an organization (Turner, 
1999) in some situations, the CEO may not be the best person for that role 
(Kaufman, Kesner, & Hazen, 1994). Whether or not an executive officer should 
be the spokesperson depends on the severity of the crisis and the executive’s 
willingness to risk public scrutiny (Rugo, 2001). If not the CEO, the spokesper-
CDC Spokespersons 
Perhaps the most telling symptom highlighting the CDC’s incapacity to fol-
low traditional crisis communication principals was its inability to control the 
number of representatives speaking to the media. Table 1 indicates that 81 dif-
ferent individuals were cited by name and title as spokespersons for the CDC 
during the crisis. CDC Director Koplan and HHS Secretary Health and Human 
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Services (HHS) Tommy Thompson1, were quoted most frequently, while 79 
other representatives were quoted at least once, some as many as 41 times. The 
media appeared to have unfettered access to a large number of CDC employees. 
The result was less than ideal. Because so many individuals spoke freely, appar-
ently in many cases without the assistance or guidance of trained public relations 
personnel, the CDC was unable to control the consistency of its public mes-
sages.  
With so many different speakers, confusing and contradictory messages 
damaging to CDC’s image and reputation were inevitable. The San Francisco 
Chronicle summed up the situation, stating, “There has been no single, compa-
rable authority on the bioterror attacks at home. The CDC has appeared reluctant 
to step into the breach, allowing mixed messages to go through state and local 
health agencies” (Hall & Stannard, 2001).  
Another troubling spokesperson issue for the CDC was the imposition, by 
outside authorities, of a limit on who could respond to the press at the onset of 
the crisis. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution reported October 28, 2001, that 
“privately, CDC staff say they were kept from speaking out in the early days of 
the outbreak by orders from HHS” (McKenna, 2001). Further, the Boston Globe 
reported, “In the first two weeks of the anthrax crisis, senior Bush administration 
officials told both Koplan and Surgeon General David Satcher to remain pub-
licly silent” (Donnelly, 2001). As seen in Table 1, HHS Secretary Tommy 
Thompson was the second most quoted spokesperson during the crisis. While he 
had oversight responsibility for the CDC, he is not a physician, an epidemiolo-
gist, or an expert in bioterrorism, and therefore in several cases, he appeared ill 
equipped and unprepared to answer sophisticated medical questions while serv-
ing as a principal CDC spokesperson. Some of his remarks were inaccurate or 
misleading, a fact quickly identified and chronicled by the media.  For example, 
he commented that the nation should be on the lookout for “mysterious health 
symptoms,” and was roundly criticized by the media for feeding hypochondria 
(Morse & Stoltz, 2001).  
A principal focus of crisis communication is the dissemination of central-
ized messages. Conveying centralized messages is vital as it represents a pri-
mary opportunity for an organization to tell its story. Early in the crisis, the CDC 
was successful in conveying the message that it was inadequately funded, ill 
equipped, and poorly housed. Shortly thereafter, President Bush visited the 
CDC’s Atlanta offices and Congress passed a bioterrorism finance bill address-
ing the CDC’s financial woes, providing it with a $4.3 billion budget, approxi-
mately $400 million more than the previous year (McKenna & Eversley, 2001).  
This success was not repeated, as the CDC did not follow up with additional 
centralized messages. Instead of seizing the opportunity to broadcast its mission, 
scope, and role, the CDC’s leadership took a more passive role, allowing staff to 
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be characterized as hardworking medical sleuths or detectives (Russakoff, 2001 
& McClam, 2001). Unfortunately, frustration over lack of progress in the inves-
tigation tarnished even this seemingly positive characterization of CDC staff.  
The fragmented function of CDC spokespersons during crisis, summarized 
in Table 1, ultimately limited the CDC’s ability to offer timely and consistent 
messages to the press. The Palm Beach Post emphasized this point, stating, 
“Good science is what you want from the CDC; good PR would be an added 
bonus” (Reid, 2001). The Boston Herald suggested that members of the CDC 
“are better at science than the bells and whistles of Web design and self-
promotion,” further supporting this finding (Brown, 2001).  
Contributing Factors 
Clearly, the CDC did not meet the standards for effective spokespersons es-
tablished in the crisis communication literature. To assume that this failure was 
completely due to error or poor planning on the part of the CDC, however, fails 
to account for the complexity of the anthrax crisis. In this section, we describe 
those factors that may have influenced or impaired the CDC’s crisis communi-
cation. 
The crisis was ambiguous because little was known about how widespread 
exposure to anthrax spores would affect the nation. The Atlanta Journal and 
Constitution reported, “When Bob Stevens, 63, a photo editor at the tabloid 
newspaper The Sun in Boca Raton, Fla., died Oct. 5 from inhaled anthrax, it 
was the first fatal U.S. case since 1976. Prior to that, only 18 cases of inhala-
tional anthrax had been seen in this country during the past 100 years” (Sea-
brook, 2001). 
In part, the CDC’s spokespersons were limited in that they simply did not 
have the information the public was demanding. The CDC operated on the basis 
of the limited knowledge it possessed. It assumed “the inhaled form of anthrax 
could not be contracted through sealed letters” (Borenstein, Murphy, & Pugh, 
2001). “[CDC] Director Jeffrey Koplan said it was ‘highly unlikely to virtually 
impossible’ for someone to develop pulmonary anthrax from spores that floated 
from one piece of mail to another” (Connolly & Nakashima, 2001). By stating 
its position in such absolute terms, the CDC calmed the fears of millions of 
Americans worried about contracting anthrax through the mail. But the calming 
benefit came at a high cost. When it became clear people who had been exposed 
to anthrax through the mail were becoming sick and dying, the CDC’s previ-
ously conclusive position caused significant damage to its reputation and credi-
bility. Senator Tom Harkin was quoted as being “upset because he had thought 
the CDC ‘was really on top of this’ and it wasn’t” (Borenstein, Murphy, & 
Pugh, 2001). It was widely reported that Harkin told CDC Director Koplan, 
“Maybe I’m wrong, but it just seems to me that something broke down here or is 
broken down. It’s obvious people are getting sick, people are dying, and we 
can’t afford to keep letting this happen . . . I am very concerned about what 
CDC is doing and how they are operating” (McClam, 2001; McKenna, 2001). 
1 The CDC is under the supervision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
Hence, Secretary Thompson was empowered to speak on behalf of the CDC during the 
anthrax crisis. 
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mal CDC spokespersons who, because they lacked coordination and vital infor-
mation, contributed to the fragmented communication of the CDC. In the political arena and among other US health professionals the news that people could contract anthrax by handling the mail resulted in an apparent wide-
spread loss of trust in the CDC.  The Washington Post reported that Health 
Commissioner George DiFerdinando acted against CDC advice when, on Octo-
ber 19, he “instructed all 1,000 postal workers at the Hamilton processing center 
to begin taking antibiotics as a precaution” (Russakoff, 2001). At the time, there 
was no evidence postal workers could contract inhalational anthrax by handling 
the mail and “officials in Washington were following the CDC’s advice not to 
treat postal workers” (Russakoff, 2001). Said DiFerdinando, “Epidemiologi-
cally, I had no data. This was a gut decision, and it’s the decision I’m proudest 
of” (Russakoff, 2001). Within three days, two postal workers “would die of 
pulmonary anthrax and [CDC]) health officials would put thousands of District 
postal workers on antibiotics” (Russakoff, 2001). 
Conclusions and Implications 
Previous research concludes that proper crisis planning is essential and is 
characterized by the establishment of crisis communication systems before cri-
ses emerge. Such systems should be fashioned after historically successful plans 
and should include mechanisms allowing for continuous communication with all 
stakeholders through the media. Cooperation among involved agencies is also 
essential to resolve the crisis and provide greater understanding for all stake-
holders. 
Effective communication plans help organizations restore credibility be-
cause they exhibit a willingness to avoid secrecy and promptly distribute infor-
mation. Successful plans encourage organizations to admit fault where necessary 
and accept responsibility, strengthening organizational legitimacy in the process. 
They allow organizations to be flexible to meet the diverse needs of all stake-
holders, especially the public’s need for accurate information on how best to 
reduce personal health risk. Successful plans for public organizations present 
centralized messages, establish procedures to continuously meet media needs, 
educate employees to provide unified messages at appropriate times, call for risk 
communication training of senior staff, and include a mechanism to determine 
the appropriate lead agency. Having one specially trained, well informed, trust-
worthy, and credible spokesperson is ideal. Typically, the CEO or another senior 
leader of the organization is called on to serve this function and deal directly 
with the media. 
In an attempt to restore its image, CDC Director Koplan defended his 
agency: “We had had no cases of inhalation anthrax in a mail sorting facility. 
There was no reason to think this was a possibility” (Meckler, 2001a). He took 
responsibility for the initial position on cross contamination and acknowledged 
it was flawed:  “Knowing what we know today, would we have done things dif-
ferently three or four days ago?  Yes” (Borenstein, Murphy, & Pugh, 2001). 
Others helped by addressing this difficult situation. White House spokesman Ari 
Fleischer attempted to refocus the public’s attention on the real culprits, telling 
reporters, “The president believes the cause of death was not the treatment made 
by the federal government or the local officials, or anyone else, but the cause of 
death was the attack made on our nation by people mailing anthrax” (Meckler, 
2001a). HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson was also quick to defend the CDC. 
He told Congress, “We’re going to err on the side of caution in making sure 
people are protected” (Meckler, 2001a). These quick and strongly supportive 
responses assisted Koplan and the CDC in restoring and repairing some of the 
damage caused by its initial stance on cross-contaminated mail. 
The anthrax attack was a highly complex, difficult crisis fraught with ambi-
guity and uncertainty. The organizational structure of the CDC, with its multiple 
centers of expertise, when coupled with numerous investigative sites, made fol-
lowing many of these communication guidelines nearly impossible. The media’s 
insatiable need for information apparently led the CDC to allow media access to 
nearly all of its employees, without any coordination except for the message that 
the CDC was understaffed, inadequately housed, and poorly funded.   Once 
Congress acted to resolve its financial concerns, the CDC could have identified 
a new central message. No new message emerged. Left to their own devices, the 
media pursued multiple avenues, putting the CDC in a poor light as the commu-
nication crisis seemed to spiral out of control. Subsequent contact with the me-
dia led to contradictory, confusing messages from different official and unoffi-
cial spokespeople. This problem was exacerbated when the CDC disseminated 
incorrect information about inhalational anthrax. With so many different voices 
speaking on behalf of the CDC, officially and unofficially, it was difficult for 
the CDC to convey its messages to the public and nearly impossible for the pub-
lic to discern which messages were authoritative and which were not. Conflict 
with other governmental agencies such as Congress and Health and Human Ser-
vices also hurt the CDC’s credibility and image. 
The crisis was complex because of the context in which the attack occurred. 
Due to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the nation was sensitized, alert, and 
aware of the potential threat of new attacks. As the crisis matured, inhalational 
anthrax deaths occurred in Florida, New Jersey, New York, Washington D.C., 
and Connecticut. Cross-contaminated mail processed through the Brentwood, 
New Jersey, postal facility found its way to dozens of locations throughout the 
country.  
The media’s heightened attention to the crisis generated an insatiable appe-
tite for new information well beyond the CDC’s ability to fully satisfy it. De-
spite 26 telebriefings conducted by the CDC during the crisis, along with 24 
formal CDC press releases, the media still sought statements and interviews 
from many current and former CDC personnel, sometimes to no avail. The 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette implied as much when it commented, “CDC officials 
would not return numerous calls seeking comment” (Labs, 2001). We suggest 
the CDC did not intentionally ignore calls; rather, there were so many calls and 
so much media pressure that the CDC and their inadequate crisis communication 
systems were overwhelmed. Unfortunately, this void was often filled by infor-
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Connolly, C., & Nakashima, E. (2001, December 6). CDC sets ‘tips’ on han-
dling mail; precautions aimed at cutting risk from anthrax traces. The 
Washington Post, p. A26. Retrieved February 26, 2002, from 
http://www.elibrary.com. 
Implications 
The CDC is not without fault in its mishandling of the spokesperson role 
during the anthrax crisis.  Attempts to provide conclusive information before 
such statements were prudent weakened the CDC’s credibility, yet crisis condi-
tions made much of the standard advice for crisis spokespersons impractical. 
The CDC’s experiences during the anthrax crisis suggest two implications. First, 
a combination of intense media pressure, active political involvement, multiple 
investigative sites, and public participation of equal yet independent elements of 
an organization make following existing guidelines on funneling all communica-
tion through designated spokespersons difficult if not futile. Much of the litera-
ture devoted to crisis communication is based on for-profit organizations with a 
focused group of stakeholders. The recommendations from this knowledge base 
cannot account for the intense scrutiny the CDC experienced during the anthrax 
crisis. Further research is needed to establish practical standards for operating in 
such a multi-faceted and complex organizational setting. 
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